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Most dictionary definitions of ‘famine’ equate it with food scarcity and widespread
hunger.  They tend to remain silent on the demographic aspects, although the extra mortality
caused by famines offers one easy and obvious gauge for ranking famines.  By this reckoning,
for example, the Great Irish Famine of the 1840s was the greatest in nineteenth-century
Europe.  By the same token some of the modern famines highlighted in media accounts are
‘small’ by historical standards.  Excess mortality, however, is only one aspect of famine
demography.  Famines typically reduce births and marriages too, and the migrations that they
often give rise to may either increase or reduce the death toll.  There are differences also
between how modern famines kill and how historical famines did so.  Modern famines differ
too in who they kill; they tend to be more class-specific and they seem even more likely to
target males than females than famines in the past.  Moreover, famines often have
demographic causes as well as consequences; and their consequences may be long-term as
well as short-term.
The human toll of famines is often difficult to measure.  Part of the problem is
conceptual.  Famine deaths may be hard to separate entirely from deaths from epidemic
diseases such as cholera and malaria.  Moreover, the dividing line between deaths resulting
from food crises and deaths resulting from a background of endemic malnutrition is often
hard to establish.  In addition, civil registration is frequently either lacking or the system
placed under great strain at the height of a crisis.  For example, in the absence of civil
registration, estimates of famine deaths in Ireland in the late 1840s depend upon assumptions
about population growth in the years preceding it and net emigration during it.  Similarly our
estimates of excess mortality in the Ukraine in the early 1930s or in China during the Great
Leap Forward famine are sometimes built on poor data and debatable assumptions.  In more
recent times estimating excess mortality from famine in sub-Saharan Africa is often little
more than educated speculation and is complicated by the coincidence of warfare and civil
disruption.  On the other hand, the demography of some famines is extremely well
documented.  
The range is well represented in this book, which offers ten case studies on the
demography of famines, historical and modern.  Some of the studies are in effect attempts to
override the defects of the available sources, while others draw on the wealth and detail of
primary source material available.  Three of our case studies concern Asian (India and Japan),
two African (Burundi and Madagascar), and four European famines (Ireland, Finland, Greece,
and Russia).  Only America is missing, but this is because famines have had a small impact
on the history of that continent (however, on Brazil see Davis, 2001:7).  A final chapter
reviews the evidence on the gender bias of famine mortality.
 Review of chapters
Our review is broadly chronological.  We therefore begin with two chapters which
address the Great Irish Famine of the 1840s.  As in most of the famines analysed in this
volume, the main cause of excess mortality was not literal starvation but infectious disease. 
The best-known data source on the human toll of the Irish famine remains the detailed ‘tables
of death’ constructed by William Wilde for the 1851 Irish census commissioners. Wilde’s
data are seductive: his cross tabulations record deaths by age, sex, cause, location and date.
However they are also notoriously defective. In their critique of Wilde’s efforts here, Joel
Mokyr and Cormac Ó Gráda propose a range of corrections to them, and produce a
nosological profile of the famine by province based on their revision. Two plausible
nosological points emerge. First, the worse-hit a region in this famine, the higher the
incidence of starvation and dysentery-diarrhoea, and the more likely were these to be
proximate causes of death. Second, the proportion of famine-related deaths due to ‘fever’
tended to be fairly constant across Ireland’s provinces, although the incidence of fever of
course increased sharply in the worst-hit provinces. The revised data also help to distinguish
between excess mortality due to hunger-induced diseases such as dysentery, and that due to
diseases such as typhoid fever, which are less the product of hunger than of the social
disruption that usually accompanies famine. Mokyr and Ó Gráda reckon that up to half the
mortality was due to diseases of the second kind. 
They then turn to a brief comparative analysis of the causes of famine mortality,
emphasising the contrast between the Irish pattern which was replicated, broadly speaking, in
nineteenth and twentieth century India and Russia, and that found in ‘modern’ environments
such as the Warsaw ghetto or the Netherlands during World War II.  Their results prompt
some reflection on the role of medical science in influencing the causes of famine deaths
(compare Johansson, 1999).  A main reason why more recent famines differ from those
further back in time is that we now understand better the role that infectious diseases play
during nutritional crises. Yet despite medical advances, in the twentieth century there have
been famines where infectious disease were the main killers (e.g. in Bengal in 1943-4  or in
Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s) and famines where they killed few (e.g. in Greece in 1942-3
and in the western Netherlands in the ‘Hungerwinter’ of 1944-5).  In the famine conditions
obtaining in the Warsaw ghetto during 1941 and 1942, where medical practitioners kept
count of the causes of the mounting death toll, only 2,503 of 82,624 deaths were attributed to
typhus against 18,245 to starvation (Kowalski et al. 1946: 12).
  
The implication seems to be that where infectious diseases are endemic in non-crisis
times they also bulk large when crisis strikes.  In such instances, something like the
connection posited by Thomas McKeown between medicine and mortality rules in reverse. 
McKeown famously claimed that in nineteenth century Europe the decline in mortality
preceded major progress in medical technology.  However, in the twentieth-century Third
World, it is the diffusion of medical techniques that has lagged: contagious diseases such as
typhoid and cholera often persist despite the existence of the medical knowledge required to
deal with them.
A careful analysis of epidemics during past famines can therefore help us towards a
better understanding of what precisely happened in the past. It is also quite obvious that such
knowledge has limited relevance to famines we may be facing today or in the future. The
understanding of the epidemiology and aetiology of infectious diseases and the physiology of
the symptoms, and the knowledge of how to treat patients suffering from basic ailments such
as fever and diarrhoea will remain with us, even if antibiotics lose some of their effectivenesswith the proliferation of drug-resistant strains. Moreover, even in the presence of severe food
scarcity, the complete collapse of hygiene and personal care can usually be prevented.
About one-in-four of those who perished during the Great Irish Famine died in
workhouses and workhouse hospitals. The chapter by Timothy Guinnane and Cormac Ó
Gráda aims to offer a better understanding of why workhouse mortality was as high as it was,
how it varied across Ireland, and how it affected different groups such as women and
children. Established under the Irish Poor Law of 1838, the workhouses were funded from
local taxation and managed by staff chosen by the local board of guardians. Thus their
operation offers a preliminary analysis of the role of local factors or ‘agency’ in determining
variations in mortality across Irish regions during the famine. The chapter provides examples
of both the case study and the comparative approach. Individual case studies yield examples
of both good and bad workhouse management. Close analysis of workhouse registers and
qualitative data offers insight into crucial factors such as the quality of health care in the
workhouses and the competence of the guardians. Accounts of individual workhouses focus
largely on how they were managed during the crisis. However, management quality is
arguably endogenous, and the relative poverty of a poor law union clearly influenced the
magnitude of the task faced by any local agent. This suggests the need for a comparative
approach. So Guinnane and Ó Gráda  also include a cross-sectional analysis of Ireland’s 130
poor law unions in order to determine which unions under- or over-performed, controlling for
the economic and locational conditions that confronted them. The authors employ
econometric methods and cross-sectional information on poor law unions before and during
the famine to examine which unions were most badly hit by the crisis and identify, after
controlling for exogenous factors, those that did unexpectedly badly or well.
Kari Pitkänen’s paper on Finland addresses the issue of sex bias.  During the Great
Finnish Famine of the 1860s, which killed more than one hundred thousand people out of a
population of 1.8 million, and also during several other periods of excess mortality in Finland
in the preceding decades, Pitkänen finds little evidence for consistent sex differentials in
mortality. However there is one significant exception.  In 1868, the peak year of famine in a
decade of famine or near-famine, men did suffer more than women.  A closer examination of
the data, however, reveals that even in 1868 sex differentials in mortality increases were
limited to certain regions and age categories.  Pitkänen’s paper rightly draws attention to the
important distinction between proportional and absolute mortality increases. He notes that
higher baseline (i.e. standard) levels of female adult mortality can help account for lower
proportional increases in female mortality compared to male. When absolute increases in
famine mortality between the sexes were compared for most of these Finnish famines, the
differentials largely disappeared.  However in 1868 males still show greater absolute
mortality rises. Overall, Pitkänen’s evidence suggests that neither sex had an inherent
biological disadvantage in resistance to the particular infectious diseases mainly responsible
for the mortality increases during these calamities. Only in 1868 were men in certain age
categories and in certain regions more likely to succumb than women.  Pitkänen argues that
this outcome was most likely linked to famine-induced temporary migration, which also
tended to be age- and sex-selective.  Moreover he stresses that in 1868 many undernourished
Finnish men worked in miserable conditions on government relief work sites, where death
rates were high. This consideration too may help account for the excess male mortality of
1868.Moving from Finland in the 1860s to India some three decades later, Tim Dyson’s
chapter examines two interrelated famines which occurred in the region of Berar during the
1890s. Dyson’s emphasis is on famine as a process and the knock-on effects and synergistic
interactions which can occur. Because Berar had good vital registration data some firm
conclusions can be drawn about the demographic consequences of these famines. The
sequence of events in both disasters was similar. Poor monsoon rains around June-August
threatened a crop failure around November-December. The death rate during the first year of
famine was unexceptional. Rather, the major death peak occurred in the second year when the
population was greatly weakened by prolonged starvation, and the returning rains triggered
outbreaks of diseases like malaria and dysentery. Mortality rose tortuously during the second
year of famine to peak in August during the monsoon, but it then it subsided rapidly,
presumably chiefly because, as in normal years, health conditions improved with the passing
of the rains. The main decline in the birth rate occurred in the third year of the process, and in
the fourth year there was a birth rate ‘rebound’.  Other things equal, the second of two close
famines is likely to be an even worse event, and this was certainly the case in 1899-1900
compared to 1896-97. The famine of 1896-1900 reduced Berar’s population by about 5 per
cent. Dyson estimates that period life expectancy in 1900 fell to only 9 years, and the
registered infant mortality rate was 415 per thousand. The poorest sections of society died the
most.  Deaths of Hindus increased more than those of Muslims. Male mortality seems to have
increased slightly more than that of females, the differential being greater for adults.
Consequently the population sex ratio after the famine was more feminine. Marriages were
delayed and there were major rises in widowhood. Interestingly, distress migration produced
a limited, temporary urbanisation in Berar; and it also caused a significantly higher registered
urban death rate compared to rural areas. In absolute terms the famines killed young children
and old people most, causing a change in population age structure. Interestingly there was
little change in the ratio of registered stillbirths to live births. Accidents and suicides
increased noticeably. Without doubt, the existence of a relatively sound database (e.g. relating
to monthly rainfall and vital events) gave Berar’s sanitary commissioners a better
understanding of the potential for dangerous cumulative chain reactions. However, because of
a lack of preparation, the sheer scale of the crises, and the generally niggardly attitude of the
colonial administration towards famine relief, the 1890s was a time of interlocking,
cumulative disaster in Berar.
The next chapter, by Arup Maharatna, also deals with the demographic consequences
of famines in India, but from a slightly wider temporal perspective. Using time series data on
prices and deaths by cause, Maharatna explores the intimate relationship between famines
and outbreaks of specific diseases during several famines which occurred between the 1870s
and the first decade of the twentieth century. His prime purpose is to question those previous
analyses of Indian famines which have seen the associated mortality as being primarily due to
the occurrence of epidemics - analyses which may therefore have seemingly implied that the
famine mortality was partly independent of the conditions of acute under-nutrition and mass
starvation which prevailed.  Maharatna is also sceptical of the suggestion that severe under-
nutrition may have had a protective effect against diseases such as malaria. The paper shows
that there is a fairly clear, although somewhat lagged, correspondence between the
development of famine distress (as reflected by rising food prices) and the occurrence of
famine mortality. During the prime period of famine almost all major causes of death showed
a rising trend, indicative of mounting under-nutrition among the population. That said, as
Maharatna indicates, the precise timing of peak mortality from specific diseases was also
partly shaped by climatic and environmental factors (e.g. the timing of the rains in the case of
malaria, and shortages of drinking water in the case of cholera) and by patterns ofmigration and crowding (e.g. in relief camps) that themselves were due to the famine
conditions. The data show clearly that the seasonal distribution of famine mortality fairly
closely reflected the usual seasonal distribution of deaths in these populations. But, as
Maharatna emphasises, what was different in these crises was the occurrence of widespread
hunger and starvation which, therefore, must be seen as ultimately responsible for the greatly
elevated scale of deaths. Very much, this chapter refocuses attention squarely upon mass
starvation as the principal underlying cause of famine mortality in India in the past.
The connection between prices, scarcity, and excess mortality addressed by Maharatna
is a traditional one.  In the cases of the famines he addresses high prices probably did reflect
increased scarcity.  However, this does not rule out the possibility, highlighted by Amartya
Sen and others, that famines can occur without increases in food prices: a reduction in the
purchasing power of some group may suffice.  Moreover, high prices could reflect bubbles
due to speculative hoarding or panic buying, rather than genuine supply shortfalls, but in that
case too they could result in starvation and increased mortality.  How markets function during
famines remains an under-researched field (Sen, 1981; Ravallion, 1996).
In the next chapter Christian Thibon offers an analysis of famines in the central
African country of Burundi over the past century or so.  The outcome, based on a
combination of oral and written sources, is a complex one, in which shifting economic and
epidemiological conditions played an important role.  Neither conventional documentary
sources nor communal memory alone reveals the full story, but a good deal can be extracted
from the analysis of mission records.  In demographic terms the broad outline of the history
of Burundian food crises is severe famines in the late pre-colonial era, followed by severe
local dearths in the 1920s, and the last major natural famine, referred to as ‘manori’ in
popular memory, in 1943-4.  Thereafter there was a hiatus, brutally broken by the inter-tribal
conflagration in 1972 which resulted in huge mortality (perhaps one in ten of the entire
population).  Since then famine-induced mortality crises have largely given way to localised
but sometimes endemic hunger or malnutrition. 
In the next chapter Serguei Adamets contrasts the histories of famines in pre- and
post-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union. He shows that from the mid-nineteenth
century the geography and intensity of famine began to change, and it seemed as if Russia
might be experiencing its final famines. However the three massive crises of the early Soviet
era killed far more people than any of the famines of the previous century. Adamets offers a
critique of earlier estimates of excess mortality during the early 1920s and 1932-33. These
estimates have been constrained by poor data, and influenced successively by Stalinist
censorship and Cold War politics. Consequently he proposes his own alternative estimates,
and exploits detailed Soviet civil registration data from the 1930s in order to offer new
insights into the age and sex characteristics of excess mortality and the main causes of death.
The analysis of causes of death allows the identification of those illnesses contributing most
to the widening of the gender gap during the famine of 1932-33. Interestingly the era of
famine in the Soviet Union did not cease until after the famine of 1946-47.
Focusing on events on the Greek island of Syros in the early 1940s, the chapter by
Violetta Hionidou uses that island’s death and birth registration records to extend our
knowledge of the demographic consequences of the famines which afflicted Greece during
World War II. Census data for the period no longer exist. But Hionidou’s analysis constitutes
a fine illustration of the value of registration records by themselves, especially if, as in this
case, they are both detailed and of high quality. Because of the singularity of circumstances
on Syros, this chapter’s conclusions have considerable significance for our generalunderstanding of famine demography. Recall first that this was a situation of famine in
Europe during the middle of the twentieth century, a fact which should underscore that any
population can potentially be subject to famine, especially during times of war.  For practical
purposes the island’s population - which was overwhelmingly urban  - was completely cut off
from the outside world.  Even fishing was prohibited.  So neither food, nor people, could get
in or out. Mortality increased very steeply fairly soon after food supplies first became short. 
The main period of famine deaths was between September 1941 and November 1942. 
Standards of public hygiene being reasonably good on Syros, there was no real problem with
infectious disease. Instead, the island’s doctors certified people as dying mostly from causes
which directly reflected famine  - such as hunger, starvation and general exhaustion.
Differentials in mortality mirrored differentials in access to what little food there was. Thus
deaths in rural areas increased, but less sharply than in the towns where most people had no
links at all to the countryside. Again, male mortality increased most, the excess over females
being greatest between ages 15 and 40.  
Interestingly, this excess male mortality seems to been particularly pronounced during
the early stages of the famine. Hionidou argues convincingly that the evidence is more
consistent with a physiological than a cultural explanation as to why men died more. There
was also a decline in fertility corresponding to the increase in mortality. Hionidou maintains
that this decline directly reflected the mounting famine stress - and that it probably operated
through decreasing fecundity because of increasing malnutrition, coupled with a widespread
loss of libido. Finally, the events on Syros are another example of two food crises occurring
in short succession; there was a less serious famine during the first half of 1944. The second
crisis saw little excess mortality, but there was a significant reduction in fertility.
Finally in this review of famines in their chronological order, we come to events in
Madagascar in the mid-1980s. The chapter by Michel Garenne, Dominique Waltisperger,
Pierre Cantrelle and Osée Ralijaona use vital registration data for Antananarivo, the island’s
capital city, to explore the effects of a quite severe food crisis which happened during 1985
and 1986. Garenne and his colleagues tell us that after achieving political independence in
1960 Madagascar’s economy deteriorated, especially from around 1971. Household incomes
and food consumption fell significantly, and mortality increased slowly between about 1976
and 1984. This was a period during which the country effectively isolated itself from contact
with western countries. However, the reestablishment of links in the mid-1980s led to the
introduction of structural adjustment policies, and from this there followed an approximate
tripling of the price of rice, the staple food, between July and December of 1985, as
government food subsidies were removed.  This caused a crisis for the inhabitants of
Antananarivo, a large fraction of whom were already living at levels of calorie intake which
were around, or below, internationally recognised minimum levels. Thus whereas in 1984
average life expectation in the city was around 51 years for males and 58 for females, by 1986
these figures had fallen to 45 and 53 years respectively. Clearly excess mortality was much
greater for males than for females, the sex differential being especially sharp in young
adulthood. An important aspect of the Antananarivo registration data - which are of good
quality and fairly complete - relates to the detailed information on cause of death. The data
show that the single category of ‘malnutrition’ was responsible for 55 per cent of excess
deaths to people aged under 15, and 34 per cent of excess deaths to people aged 15 years and
over. For both age categories deaths due to ‘diarrhoea and dysentery’ were the second most
important cause of excess mortality. And for adults there was also a sharp increase in deaths
from ‘other cardiovascular diseases’. The data also indicate an increase in suicide. Garenne
and his colleagues conclude with the observation that recognising the fact and nature of a
crisis are essential for remedying it. However, this ‘silent’ famine went almost unnoticed, incontrast to a - possibly related - outbreak of malaria which hit the city in 1988 and which did
receive wide public attention. Interestingly too, the effects of the food crisis remained hidden
in the results of the 1992 Demographic and Health Survey mainly because, due to small
numbers, the survey grouped data into time periods of five years in length, so obscuring the
famine.
The final two chapters in the book are somewhat different in that rather than focusing
on particular crises at specific times, instead they consider famines in comparative
perspective.  The chapter by Osamu Saito addresses Japanese famines in long-run historical
perspective - in fact, for the period stretching from the seventh to the late nineteenth century.
To do this Saito examines carefully some novel data sources and he adopts an innovative
weighting approach when gauging the changing severity of famines (and epidemics). The
frequency of famines during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) was probably less than in late
medieval times. And, indeed, during the Tokugawa period there was some limited further
reduction in famine frequency - even though major countrywide famines still occurred during
the 1780s and the 1830s. However famines virtually disappeared in Japan from the 1840s
onwards. Saito also addresses the changing causal basis of Japanese famines. In this context
the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century saw a gradual move away from
dependency on dry-field cultivation towards the cultivation of a newly introduced ‘red’ rice
variety which needed wet-field sites. This gradual shift in growing patterns required
considerable investment in agricultural infrastructure (e.g. irrigation canals), but it meant that
from being a major cause of famines, ‘drought’ became only a minor cause. Thus, especially
from the seventeenth century onwards, it was the occurrence of cool winters (which restricted
crop growth) that became the major cause of famines in Japan. Finally Saito addresses the
issue of how much famines affected population growth. Here, as he notes, particularly
following the work of Watkins and Menken (1985), it has become rather fashionable to
discount famines as major regulators of population growth. However, the Japanese case
contradicts any such new orthodoxy. Thus focusing particularly on the Tokugawa period,
Saito shows that famines were a major factor governing the rate of population growth. And
they were much more important in this respect than were epidemics. Much of this
demographic regulatory effect of famines seems to have operated through the reduction of
fertility, and the effect was especially pronounced simply because the usual level of marital
fertility was only moderate. Indeed, it was the elimination of famines after about 1840 that
laid the basis for sustained population growth in Japan.
The final chapter in the book is by Kate Macintyre. It addresses a feature which
appears in nearly all of the preceding chapters  - the fact that excess male famine mortality
appears to have exceeded that of females. Accordingly Macintyre’s chapter has two related
objectives: first to establish, and second to account for, this phenomenon. Of course, the
suggestion that the mortality of males is raised by slightly more than that of females during
famines is not new. However, as she remarks, sometimes social scientists have rather shied
away from the indication - indeed, occasionally they have almost denied it - perhaps partly
because it seems at odds with the view that in most societies it is the women who have the
worse deal in life. Accordingly, Macintyre assembles data from a lot of different famines, in
very diverse populations, places and times, to establish the point beyond reasonable doubt:
famines increase male mortality by more than that of females in most cases. Moreover, this
happens even in the most patriarchal of societies. The few studies which appear to be
exceptions to the rule are usually based upon questionable data. The ‘female mortality
advantage’ tends to be greatest between roughly ages 20 and 45 years (which, of course, are
also the main years of reproduction for women). Having established that this female
advantage is not the outcome of faulty data, she turns to the much more difficult issue ofcausation. Here there is no shortage of possible explanations - both biological and social -
which she proceeds to consider. The very frequency of greater male than female famine
mortality suggests to us that, ultimately, it has a biological foundation. This may have arisen
out of evolutionary processes, which are then conditioned, and often strengthened, by a host
of other considerations in different contexts.  Macintyre herself notes that studies of
mammals tend to show that females have a basic mortality advantage over males during times
of stress, which may well reflect their more pivotal role for purposes of reproduction and
species survival. Of the several possible biological mechanisms she considers, the fact that
women have higher reserves of body fat is certainly an attractive explanation. Moreover, it is
interesting to note that because fat is an asset which presumably reduces with time (as the
body’s reserves are run down) it may help to explain Hionidou’s finding for Syros that the
female mortality advantage reduced as the famine itself progressed. Finally, however,
Macintyre emphasises that any biological mechanisms will be overlain by a host of possible
social considerations (not all of which necessarily benefit women). In this context she
mentions women’s fundamental role as child-carers and home keepers, and their sometimes
more harmonious relationship with nature. She notes too that today aid agencies and famine
relief operations often work on the basis of ‘women and children first’. And she concludes by
underlining the complexity of the phenomenon and the need for future research to employ
different, yet complementary approaches. 
General discussion
Having provided a foretaste of what each chapter holds, we now focus on some of the
broader considerations which arose from the discussions at the meeting at the Fondation des
Treilles, only some of which have been touched on in the preceding review. To avoid
repetition and because they have been covered by others (e.g. see Watkins and Menken, 1985;
Bongaarts and Cain, 1982; Hugo, 1984) we will not dwell too long on the most basic
demographic consequences of famines. The core facts are simple: deaths tend to increase,
births tend to decrease and people tend to migrate out of the afflicted area. However Table 1
offers a more detailed listing of the demographic consequences of famines, both short and
longer term, with some comments and qualifications. Of course, the statements made in Table
1 are generalisations. What actually happens in a crisis will depend upon the particular
circumstances which prevail. Table 1 -  THE DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS OF FAMINES:
 SOME GENERALISATIONS, COMMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Generalisations                                                              Comments/qualifications
Mortality
1. Mortality increases during times of famine Possible exceptions: lesser food crises; and cases
where conditions associated with famine (e.g.
drought) lead to a reduction in certain diseases
(e.g. malaria) and/or lead to the provision of
adequate famine relief measures.
2. Famines usually involve an amplification of the
‘normal’ seasonal distribution of deaths
This amplification may be complicated and
overlain by famine-induced outbreaks of
particular diseases (e.g. measles, typhus).
However, knowledge of the normal seasonal
distribution of deaths in a population is useful for
helping to limit the volume of famine mortality.
3. Increased under-nutrition is the principal
underlying cause of famine mortality; it reflects a
lack of access to food among a part (or, rarely, all)
of the population
In environments with high loads of infectious
disease many famine deaths will involve such
diseases; however, in low infectious disease
environments many famine deaths will be
attributed directly to causes such as ‘malnutrition’
and ‘starvation’.
 
4. Especially in poor agricultural populations,
famines and epidemics often interact
synergistically
Famines can cause epidemics (e.g. through
migration and crowding); epidemics can cause
famines (e.g. by disrupting agricultural activities).
So while at the individual level there may be
synergistic links between malnutrition and
infectious diseases, analogous interactions can
also occur at the aggregate level.
5. The largest number of famine deaths happen to
young children; this age group and the elderly
experience the greatest absolute increases in death
rates
Compared to normal times these age groups are
under-represented after the famine (see effect 16
below).
6. The greatest proportional increases in death
rates tend to occur at ages where death rates are
relatively low during normal times
In high mortality populations this means that the
greatest proportional increases may occur at
around ages 10-45; but in low mortality
populations infants and young children may also
experience significant proportional mortality
increases.
7. The mortality of males increases by more than
that of females
Excess male mortality is especially pronounced in
the prime adult years; the near-universality of this
phenomenon points to its having an underlying
biological basis (e.g. relating to differential levels
of body fat). It seems that the greater the role of
starvation in mortality the stronger is this effect.8. The frequency of suicide increases during
famines
There are good grounds for thinking that this
happens, at least during the most severe crises. It
may well be that men are more likely to commit
suicide than women.
9. Famine mortality varies inversely with socio-
economic status
Perhaps this is obvious, but it is worth stating. The
rich, at least, are usually able to access sufficient
food supplies. However famines today may be
more class-specific than in the past.
Fertility
10. The build-up of famine conditions causes a
lagged decline (lag duration approximately 9
months) in births
The timing of the decline in conceptions usually
corresponds closely to the increase in famine
stress. A fertility reduction is probably an even
more common feature of famines than is a
mortality increase (see effect 1 above).
11.Famines induce a decline in the frequency of
marriages.
This almost always happens, as marriage plans are
abandoned  or  postponed. 
 
12. Social and psychological factors contribute to
fertility decline in all famines; biological factors
tend to operate only in the most severe and
lengthy crises
The first two types of factors (examples,
respectively, are spousal separation through sex-
selective migration and a reduction in libido)
work through reduced coital frequency.
Anovulation due to severe malnutrition is
probably the most important of the various
physiological mechanisms.
13. Soon after the end of famine there is usually a
short-term increase - ‘rebound’ - in births
Due to effect 10 above, a higher-than-usual
proportion of women are at risk of becoming
pregnant at the end of the famine. Moreover, the
various famine-induced constraints on coital
frequency and fecundity cease. Equally there is a
re-bound in the marriage rate as normalcy returns.
Migration
14. Migration is a feature of most famines. People
move in search of food/work
Migration as a famine response has probably
increased during the modern era with
improvements in transport and communication.
Migration tends to be selective (e.g. by sex).
15. Famine migration can have either positive or
negative mortality effects, for the migrants, those
they leave behind, and therefore for the total
population
Migration can weaken people and spread disease.
But as economies have generally become more
diverse, and transport and communications have
improved, so migration has probably come to
have a net beneficial effect on the overall level of
famine mortality.
Population structure and longer term effects
16. Because of effect 5 above, other things equal,
the post-famine population age structure has
proportionally more people aged 10-45 than
applied pre-famine
Consequently, other things equal, the crude birth
rate tends to be higher and the crude death rate
lower than they would otherwise be for an
extended period following the end of the famine.17. Because of  effect 7 above, other things equal,
the post-famine population structure is more
feminine than applied pre-famine
This effect too tends to contribute to a slightly
higher crude birth rate over the medium run than
would otherwise prevail. It is additional to effect
13 above, which is of relatively short duration.
18. Together effects 16 and 17 boost the rate of
natural increase over the medium-run, speeding
demographic recovery
Again, this effect is other things equal.
19. Famines have long-run consequences for the
health  of affected survivors
Several analyses support this, most notably those
relating to the Dutch ‘hunger winter’ of 1944 (e.g.
see Lumey 1998). However, for most famines the
data to demonstrate such long-lasting
consequences do not exist.
It is often claimed that famine is an ineffective remedy against population pressure because
population growth tends to fill the resultant demographic vacuum.  In Finland, for example,
population grew much faster after the major famine of 1868 than before it, filling the void left by
famine deaths after a few years.  And in Ireland in the half century or so following the major famine
of 1740-1 population grew faster than in any subsequent period.  Yet one major demographic
conclusion which arose from the meeting was that it is dangerous to dismiss the role of famines in
helping to control population growth in times past. Of course, during the modern era demographic
growth has been the norm. And with high levels of fertility prevailing, it has been common for
developing country populations to be growing at two, three, or even more per cent each year. In
these circumstances the loss of quite a large fraction of the total population can be ‘made up’ in a
short period of time. Simple arithmetic tells us that even a population growing at one per cent each
year will recover a ten per cent loss in just under ten years. However, in historical conditions
moderate, rather than high fertility seems often to have been the norm and populations grew slowly,
if at all. And in these circumstances - particularly if there were interactions with epidemic diseases -
famines could have significant effects in limiting demographic growth. Thus here Saito shows that,
even without much interaction with disease (related to its geographical and social isolation)
Tokugawa Japan was probably a case where famines did play a significant role in restricting
demographic growth.  Even a single great crisis can have very long-lasting effects. For example, the
likelihood that the population of England’s south, south-east, and east midlands was less on the eve
of the Black Death in 1348 than in 1300 is probably due to its failure to recover from the prolonged
agrarian crisis of the second decade of the fourteenth century (Hallam, 1988: 1004-5).  And in
Ireland the mass migration that followed in the wake of the potato failures of the 1840s created its
own dynamic. The sharp rise in the stock of Irish people abroad, highly concentrated in urban
ghettos, produced a ‘friends and neighbours’ effect that accounted for part of the post-famine
outflow (Ó Gráda  and O’Rourke, 1997). Moreover, by reducing the size of the domestic market,
emigration must have also reduced the scope for specialisation somewhat, and thereby reduced the
population further in the long run (Whelan, 1999).  
The contents of this book also illustrate that food crises often come in pairs - so-called
‘bang/bang’ famines. Having been weakened by one food crisis a population will be more
susceptible to another, unless circumstances improve. There are several mechanisms through which
an initial famine may help generate a second disaster  --  for example, the eating of precious seed-
corn, or the generation of epidemics which in turn disrupt agricultural activities.Perhaps inevitably, much of the discussion at the Fondation des Treilles was concerned with
famine causation.  Because they involve a series of interlocking processes, it is difficult to
completely isolate discussion of the causes of famines from discussion of their effects. In this
context Joel Mokyr proposed the schema shown in Figure 1.  In this conceptual plan natural
calamities (e.g. drought, flood, frost, a cold summer) and socio-political events (e.g. warfare,
political isolation, policy-induced structural shifts, or economic disruption) constitute the two
main proximate triggers of famines. And, of course, both these types of trigger can combine
and interact. In turn, the triggers produce hunger and starvation either through a reduction in
the total amount of food that is available to the population or through the creation of an
imbalance between the effective demand and supply of food in the population. The latter
situation may arise, for example, if a large section of a poor community becomes unemployed
- a case which, using Sen’s (1981) terminology, would be an entitlement failure in the
absence of a food availability decline (FAD).
In practice, most food crises probably involve some combination of both of the kinds of
intermediate effects shown in Figure 1.  Food availability declines are usually implicated in
famine causation (Dyson 1996: 74). In this volume FADs were involved to a greater or lesser
degree in all of the famines which pre-dated the twentieth century, and in those in Burundi
during the first half of the twentieth century.  However, as we advance further into the
twentieth century so FAD tends to play a lesser role.   The famines in Russia, Greece, and
Africa (as exemplified here by Burundi and Madagascar) reflect this shift.
 
The next component of the famine process are the economic and social effects (see Figure 1
below). Food prices rise, people migrate, and there is social disruption. In turn, these
processes generate hunger and starvation and spread disease. And again, starvation and
disease will probably interact. Finally, there are the various demographic effects listed in
Table 1, the most important of which is the rise in deaths.
Of the two proximate triggers identified in Figure 1 it is certain that over time socio-
political events - especially warfare - have become increasingly responsible for famines. Of
course murderous famines have often been caused or exacerbated by wars in the historical
past. But as the examples of much of Europe in 1740-41, Ireland in the 1840s or India in the
1870s and 1890s show, in the past peace was no insurance against the Third Horseman.
Malthus, of course, envisaged famine as nature’s ‘ultimate response’ to population
outstripping food supply. However, in the twentieth century famines have owed much more
to Mars than to Malthus. Socio-political considerations - like Stalinist ideology, ethnic
divisions and post-colonial strife - have mattered more than the sheer incapacity of nature to
deliver food. The case for a ‘Whig’ interpretation of famine decline - whereby gradual
economic betterment has gradually reduced the incidence and severity of famines - may fit
countries such as pre-industrial England and Scotland. And in the late colonial era in Africa a
combination of ‘effective government, wider markets, and some increase in average wealth’
has also brought a significant reduction in famines (Iliffe, 1987). Yet as an account of global
trends such an optimistic interpretation is much weakened by the importance of ‘political
famines’ during the twentieth century (Devereux, 2000). Another shift in the combination of factors shown in Figure 1 relates to that between
starvation and infectious disease. In most of the crises described in this book mortality was
not due mainly to starvation, but rather to infectious disease. However, over time medical and
administrative progress have probably produced a decline in the proportion of deaths caused
by infectious diseases in famines. That decline has probably increased the relative importance
of those physiological factors which place women in a stronger position to withstand famine.
And perhaps this helps to explain why males were proportionately much more likely to
succumb on Syros in 1942 or Antananarivo in 1985-86 than in, say, Ireland or India during
the nineteenth century. 
A related point is that although, as Table 1 conveys, famines have always
disproportionately targeted the poor, in the past they also killed many people who were not
poor but could not protect themselves against infectious disease. Indeed, in the past medical
practitioners, clergymen and people engaged in relief work could be particularly at risk of
death. And city dwellers too were put in jeopardy by the unwelcome arrival of famished
peasants seeking relief and charity. However the studies assembled here imply that medical
progress may have made famine mortality more class-specific. Developments such as
penicillin, electrolytes and antibiotics have meant that richer people at risk of succumbing to
famine fevers in the past can now take preventive or curative action. Thus whereas in the past
the poor could count, to some extent at least, on the enlightened self-interest of the better-off
to help relieve the worst of famine, either by relieving beggars or isolating suspected carriers
of disease, today the motives for such action can be weaker. Moreover, for the poor the
remedies just mentioned may be available in theory, but the purchasing power to make them
effective is usually lacking.  Describing conditions in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s an American
doctor noted the ‘expensive, modern materials’ destined for the army, while ‘we still lack
cheap vitamin pills and other medicines to cure children with illnesses from the Middle Ages’
(Heiden, 1992: 168).
And what of famine in the future? In considering this issue it is hard not to remark
that the very meaning of the word ‘famine’ seems to have changed somewhat during recent
years - no doubt partly reflecting changes in the ‘real world’. Famine in the classical sense of
widespread hunger and starvation, steeply rising mortality and, perhaps above all, social
breakdown, is a relatively rare event today.  Perhaps the last such episode - of famine in an
almost biblical sense - occurred in Ethiopia during 1984-85. However, while still dreadful,
the famines which have appeared on our television screens more recently, often from
Sahelian Africa, are different, more restricted events. At least in some respects, the world has
become a different place. To reiterate, the causes of most recent famines are usually much
more attributable to ‘man’ (and unfortunately the gender of this word is all too appropriate)
than to natural calamities. Warfare is usually the main contextual event, although natural
events like drought may still play a role. Moreover nowadays economies are generally more
diversified and there are greater chances for migration. To repeat, our knowledge of disease
transmission and containment is much greater than in the past, so famine mortality tends to be
restricted.  International consciousness, at least potentially, is there. Supplies of food can be
moved relatively swiftly, and a lot can be achieved even with small amounts of food aid. The
result of these developments is that one authority has gone so far as to say that the chances of
someone dying from famine in sub-Saharan Africa today have become ‘vanishingly small’
(Seaman, 1993:31).
But while famines in this new, more restricted sense may continue to prevail - although
hopefully on a declining trend - it would be foolish to completely rule out the chances of
another massive disaster -  a famine of widespread starvation, a colossal number of deathsand general social disintegration. Indeed, if we adopt a sufficiently long time period into the
future, then we can be fairly certain that a famine of this type will occur. Thus in a global
economic system based on comparative advantage a calamitous famine might happen if for
some reason a population became cut-off from the rest of the world. The recent events in
North Korea, for example, should remind us of this. It is also possible to imagine the violent
break-up of a very large country in which the circumstances and sheer scale of events means
that adequate supplies of food and other assistance cannot be provided from outside. There
are a few major nations in Asia to which, just conceivably, this could happen.  No one really
foresaw the break up of the former Soviet Union.  In that instance the risk of a food crisis was
reduced by the provision of food aid from the West.  Environmental changes may also
assume an increasing role in causing famines in the future.  Thus a major sudden change in
the global climate would probably produce serious FADs, with particularly grave
consequences for poor countries (on the past role of climatic shifts in late nineteenth-century
famines see Davis, 2001).
Several other considerations might complicate responses to future famines. For
example, much of the world is urbanising, fast. Although the Soviet famines studied by
Adamets give us some experience of famines in urban areas, the Soviet cities afflicted in the
1920s and 1930s were small compared to the massive and still growing urban agglomerations
which are found in much of Asia and Africa today.  Recall too that urban populations may
have very weak links with their surrounding rural areas which, in any case, in the modern
world may not supply the food that they eat. Indeed, almost everywhere nowadays urban
dwellers tend to have scant knowledge of how their food is produced, where it is comes from,
and how it is supplied. That said, major centres also tend to command the financial and
political means required to alleviate the consequences of food shortage.  Yet another factor
which could conceivably complicate the response to a really calamitous famine in the future
is the run-down of cereal stocks by the main exporting nations, based partly on the hope -
alas, not always fulfilled - that this will induce cereal importing nations to build up their own
supplies.
Other crucial complicating factors are denial and complacency. The rapid recent
spread of HIV/AIDS in many countries is a powerful reminder of just how much harm both
these factors can do. But, of course, they also operate apropos conditions of famine. Clearly,
if the build-up to a food crisis is avoided or suppressed by the government, then a famine is
both more likely to occur and more likely to be large in scale. Any kind of response to famine
depends upon some initial recognition that a crisis is happening. Yet the instances are legion
where those in power deny that a famine is occurring. Indeed, several famines dealt with in
this book suffered from this element. In this context Drèze and Sen (1989; see also Sen,
1999) have argued convincingly that famine denial is more likely to occur in the absence of
an independent press. That said, even where the press has some independence, politicians and
administrators are still likely to find open recognition of famine embarrassing and difficult.
So in the future, as in the past, denial of famine will probably operate. And to the extent that
famines increasingly have largely ‘human’ causes, the problem may become even more acute.
Politicians find it is easier to blame a food crisis on a natural calamity than to assume some
responsibility themselves.  It also an undeniable but unpalatable fact that the arrival of food
aid from outside can sometimes  sustain the autocrats whose actions were largely responsible
for the famine in the first place (de Waal, 1992).
Complacency relating to policies, is a more subtle, but related factor which may also
contribute to the genesis of some future famines, both large and small. The instigation of
inappropriate economic policies has been a major contributory cause to many famines in thepast. And a word of caution for the contemporary world is perhaps appropriate here. For
example, currently we inhabit an international system in which policies of trade liberalisation
and open markets hold tremendous sway. This is the way the world is moving, often with
benefit. However, as the hidden famine in Antananarivo illustrates well, policies can
sometimes be introduced from outside without proper consideration to their possible side-
effects. Neo-liberal economic policies can ignore important institutional considerations. What
the ‘best’ set of policies is for a particular location may not always be the same. More
generally we echo the words of Nathan Keyfitz (1991:15) that ‘[i]f we have one point of
empirically backed knowledge it is that bad policies are widespread and persistent. Social
science has to take account of them.’  For sure, bad policies will contribute to famines in the
future.
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